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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT I. CORNE, for and on be-
half of himself and all stockholders of 
HELIANCE NATIONAL LIFE 
IXSCRANCE COl\IPANY, simi-
larly situated, 
Plaintiff and AppellanJ, 
VS. 
FHAXK B. SALISBURY, 
Defendant and Respondent. Case No. 
----- ) 10814 
ROBERT I. CORNE, for and on be-
blf of HELIAXCE X ATION AL 
LIFE INSURANCE COl\IP ANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FIL\XK B. SALISBURY, 
Defendant and Respondent., 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATE)IENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County for and on behalf of him-
self, awl Reliance National Life Insurance Company 
1 
and for and on behalf of all stockholders of said Com. 
pany pursuant to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to recover from defendant secret and unlawful 
profits realized by defendant in the sale by defendant 
of control of and over the said Reliance National Life 
Insurance Company in violation of defendant's fiduciary 
duties. · 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY 
THE LO,VER COURT 
The lower court, Judge :Faux, in his "l\lemoran-
dum Decision" of December 22, 1966 (R. 41) and his 
"Judgment of Dismissal" on December 28 ,1966, (R. 
42) granted defendant's "Motion to Dismiss or in the 
Alternative to Strike." Plaintiff is appealing herein 
from the said dismissal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is submitted in this appeal that the rulings of the 
lower court granting defendant's l\Iotion to Dismiss. 
should be reversed for error of law and the case remand-
ed to the District Court with instructions to deny the 
:Motion to Dismiss of defendant and require defendant 
to answer or otherwise plead. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
The facts underlying the appeal may be readily 
capsulized. Appellant filed an action in the United 
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States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Di,·ision on August 25, 1965, (Civil No. C-170 65), 
( R. 50-395). In that Action, four other defendants 
were named in addition to defendant Salisbury. Each 
defendant, including defendant Salisbury, was per-
sonally served by a United States Marshal outside of 
the State of Utah. Defendant Salisbury was served 
at Phoenix, Arizona ( R. 82) . 
The action of plaintiff Cohne (Appellant herein) 
in the e nited States District Court was based on vio-
lation of federal securities statutes and regulations. 
After several hearings, the United States District Court 
granted plaintiff Colme the right to amend his Com-
plaint and the Amended Complaint was filed on De-
cember 30, 1965. (R. 144-158). On March 7, 1966, 
.T udge Christensen struck from plaintiff's pleadings 
the phrase "or are pendent to claims arising under and 
based solely thereon." (R. 148). It was to the Amended 
Complaint in the United States District Court with 
the aforesaid language stricken by order of the Court, 
that defendants therein filed motions to dismiss. At no 
time did rtn.lf of the defendants in that action enter a 
;1e11eral appearance and each defendant in every plead-
inr; carefully appeared specially solely to contest juris-
diction. On July 6, 1966, Judge Christensen entered 
his ":\Iemorandum Decision" dismissing plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint (R. 386-388) on the grounds of 
failure of jurisdiction in the said United States District 
Court action. 
Subsequent to the dismissal of the United States 
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District Court action, which said action was based solely 
on federal statutes and wherein extraterritorial service 
was sought under express federal statutory authoriza-
tion, l\Ir. Cohne, Appellant herein, filed an action in 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and obtained personal service upon Mr. 
Salisbury at Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 9-11.) De-
fendant-Respondent filed a ".Motion to Dismiss or in 
the Alternative to Strike" on September 26, 1966. (R. 
38-39.) The sole argument of Defendant-Respondent 
herein in support of his motion to dismiss heard by the 
lower court on October 17, 1966, was that the dismissal 
of the federal court action somehow constituted a bar 
to any action thereafter against defendant Salisbury. 
ARGUlHENT 
POINT I 
THE CLAC\I OF PLAINTIFF CORNE IN 
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT ACTION (CIVIL 
NO. C-170-65 JAROSE FROl\I CONDUCT OF 
DEFENDANTS THEREIN (INCLUDING DE· 
FENDANT SALISBURY) VIOLATIVE OF 
FEDERAL LA ,V. THE ELEMENTS OF CIVIL 
LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL RULE IOb-
5 ARE NOT THE SAl\IE AS COI\-Il\10N LAW 
FRAUD OR DECEIT. 
The action of Plaintiff Cohne (Appellant herein) 
in federal court was based solely on alleged violation of 
4 
Section 10 ( b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. Section 78j )and Rule lOb-5 (17 C.:F.R. 
;2-iO.lOb-5) promulgated by the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission pursuant to authority of 
the Exchange Act. 
Rule IOb-5 reads: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly 
or indirectly by the use of any means or instru-
mentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, 
or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change, ( 1) to employ any device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud, ( 2) to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, 
or ( 3) to engage in any act, practice or course 
of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security." 
Each of the Circuit Courts which has considered 
IOb-5 ciYil liability has found that claims such as pleaded 
by plaintiff in the instant case, would lie. (See cases 
collected by Loss, Securities Regulation (2d Ed. 1961) 
Yol. Ill at page 1763). But no court has treated the 
matter more definitively than the Ninth Circuit in the 
case of Ellis v. Carter, 291 F. 2d 270 (1961). In the 
Ellis case the Court set forth at length the possible in-
terpretations of the scope and requirements of lOb-5 
ciYil liability. It acknowledges certain "anomalies" 
and then states (at page 27 4) : 
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" ( 4) Appellees further argue that if we re-
affirm Matheson [Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 
:F. 2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960)} we should at least 
hold that appellant mus~ allege and ultimately 
prove genuine fraud, as distinct from 'a mere 
misstatement or omission', to paraphrase the 
language of subparagraph (2) of Rule lOb-5. 
This is in effect, a challenge to the validity of 
subparagraph ( 2) of the rule. It is predicated 
on the idea that a proscription of material mis-
statements and half-truths without using fraud 
or scienter language is not a permissible imple-
mentation of Section 10 (b). 'Ve msagree. Sec-
tion IO ( b) speaks in terms of the use of 'any 
manipulative device or contrivance' in contra-
vention of rules and re,qulations as might be pre-
scribed bJJ the Commission. It would have been 
difficult to frame the authority to prescribe regu-
lations in broader terms. Had Congress intended 
to limit this authority to regulations proscribing 
common-law fraud, it would probably have said 
so. We see no reason to go beyond the plain mean-
ing of the word 'anJJ', indicatin,g that the use of 
manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances 
of whatever kind maJJ be forbidden, to construe 
the statute as if it read 'any fraudulent devices'." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Loss, supra, page 1435 says: 
"The fact is that the courts have repeatedly 
said that the fraud provisions in the SEC acts. 
as well as the mail fraud statute, are not limited 
to circumstances which would give rise to a com-
mon law action for deceit. (Citing cases.)" 
In Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Banker.~ 
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Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (':V.D. Ky. 1960) the Court 
said (at page 23): 
"I am of the opinion that it was the intention 
of the Congress by this legislation to give the 
purchaser of invalid bonds a right to recover 
without the necessity of offering proof of deceit 
and intentional fraud. The statute contemplates 
a new right of action for the good faith purchaser 
to rl'Cot•er from the seller for constructive fraud 
which grows out of the failure to make a full and 
complete disclosure." (Emphasis added.) 
The 1965 case of Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F. 2d 375 
(10th Cir.) settled for this Circuit the question of· 
whether a civil action arising under or based upon vio-
lation of the proscriptions of Rule IOb-5 required proof 
of the elements of common law fraud or deceit. Stevens 
originated in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division, and was tried to 
Chief Judge 'Villis ,Y. Ritter. The appellant in that 
case argued that an action based on Rule lOb-5 was 
essentially the same as a common law fraud or deceit 
action, that the plaintiff had failed to prove certain 
elements of common law fraud and that, therefore, the 
judgment for plaintiff should be reversed. In affirming 
the trial court, the Circuit Court said (at page 379) : 
"It is not necessary to allege or prove common 
law fraud to make out a case under the statute 
and rule. It is only necessary to prove one of 
the prohibited actions such as the material mis-
statement of fact or the omission to state a ma-
terial fact (citing) . " 
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Professor Loss, the acknowledged authority in the 
field says, concerning the elements of liability under 
Rule lOb-5: 
"Indeed, the plaintiff is not limited to proYin()' 
an untrue statement or an omission but has re~ 
course to the possibly broader 'fraud' language 
of the first and third clauses of the rule. (Citing.) 
The other elements of common law deceit -
reliance, causation and scienter (citing) are not 
mentioned .... " Loss, Securities Regulation, 
( 1961), Vol. III at page l 765. 
In the case of SEC t'. Cavital Gains llcscarc!i 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 11 L. Ed. 2d :237, 84 S. Ct. 
275 (1963), the Supreme Court said (at 11 L. Ed. 
237, at 246, footnote 39) : 
" . . . It is to be noted that it is not necessary 
that the person making the misrepresentatim{s 
intend to cause loss to the other or gain a profit 
for himself; it is only necessary that he intend 
action in reliance on the truth of his misrepre-
sentations. 1 Harper and James, the Law of 
Torts (1956), 531". 
POINT II 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COl_TRT 
DISl\fISSED PLAINTIFF'S COl\f PLAINT IX 
CIVIL NO. C-170-65, S 0 LE LY ON THE 
GROUNDS OF FAILURE OF JURISDIC-
TION. 
Defendant Salisbury, Respondent herein, neyer 
entered a general appearance in the United States Dis-
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trict Court action. In every stipulation to which defend-
ant (Respondent) Salisbury was a party, he expressly 
provided that execution of the stipulation should not 
constitute a general appearance. See, for example, 
Stipulation dated September 23, 1965 (R. 89-90); 
Stipulation dated October 23, 1965, (R. 99-100); Stip-
ulation dated November 18, 1965 (R. 127-128); Stipu-
lation dated January 12, 1966, ( R. 162-163) : Stipula-
tion dated February 3, 1966, (R. 204-205). 
The sole and only question or issue raised by de-
fendant (Respondent) Salisbury in the federal court 
action was alleged failure of jurisdiction. See, for 
example, ":Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction", 
( R. 96-97) filed by defendant Salisbury on October 
18, 1965, ".Memorandum of Defendant Frank B. Salis-
bury in support of .Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Juris-
diction" (R. 237-243) filed on April 1, 1966. 
POINT III 
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DID NOT HAYE PERSONAL JURISDIC-
TIO~ OYER THE DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL 
NO. C-170-65 EXCEPT AS TO CLAIMS BASED 
SOLELY ON THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
ACT OF 1934. 
In both the original Complaint (Paragraph 6, R. 
60-61) and the Amended Complaint (Paragraph 4, 
R. 147-148), jurisdiction in the United States District 
Court action (Civil No. C-170-65) was based solely 
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upon Section 10 (h) of the Securities Act of 1934 (Sec-
tion 78j of Title 15, U.S.C.A.) and Rule lOb-5 (Title 
17, C.F.R., Section 240.lOb-5) promulgated by the 
Dinted States Securities and Exchange Commission 
thereunder. 
All of the defendants in the federal Court action 
were served personally outside of the State of Utah. 
Defendant Salisbury was served by a U. S .. Marshal 
at Phoenix, Arizona. (R. 82-84.) Section 27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ( 15 U.S. C.A. Sec-
tion 78aa) permits service upon a defendant beyond 
the territorial limits of a United States District Court 
in actions based upon violation of the federal statute or 
regulations promulgated thereunder. The provision is 
a radical departure from traditional concepts of due 
process and jurisdiction and the Courts have tended to 
strictly construe its applicability. 
In a recent case, as in the case at bar, based on Rule 
lOb-5, and wherein jurisdiction of the federal court 
as to common law claims asserted to he pendent to the 
federal statutory claims, Judge Doyle, United States 
District Court Judge for the District of Colorado wrote: 
"Englert's final argument challenges the 
jurisdiction of this Court over his person. He was 
served pursuant to the extraterritorial service of 
process provision contained in Section 27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, and while he concedes 
that this service was sufficient to obtain jurisdic-
tion over his person with respect to the f e<leral 
claims, he maintains that it was insufficient to 
do so with respect to the claims based on the 
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Kansas statute, i.e., the third claims of each com-
plaint, Englert acknowledges that these state 
claims, in accordance with Hurn v. Oursler (cit-
ing) are 'pendent' to the federal claims. How-
ever, he maintains that this doctrine applies 
only with respect to jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, and not jurisdiction of the person. The 
authorities on this point are in conflict. (Citing.)" 
Trussell, et al. v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 
et al., 236 F. Supp. 801, 803 (1964). 
The Court said further (at page 804) : 
"Undoubtedly, the issues underlying pendent 
subject matter jurisdiction and pendent personal 
jurisdiction are different. The fundamental issue 
decided in Hurn v. Oursler, supra, was that 
pendent subject matter jurisdiction was em-
braced within the scope of subject matter juris-
diction permitted by Article 3 of the United 
States Constitution; it was there recognized that 
Congress has conferred this jurisdiction upon 
the federal courts. The question was whether 
Congress had the power to do so . . . In any 
event, after Hurn v. Oursler, there can be little 
doubt that Congress has the power to allow 
extraterritorial service of process with respect 
to pendent state claims. The sole question is 
whether Congress has provided for such service. 
Congress has not provided explicitly for such 
service, neither by the statute here in question, 
Title 15, U.S.C. Section 78aa, nor has it done 
so by rule. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. 
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 66 S. Ct. 242, 90 
L. Ed. 185 (1946). The question remains 
whether it should be here implied. Sanction of 
extraterritorial service has been implied, at least 
once, from the terms of a federal statute, United 
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States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 C.S. 
199, 32 S. Ct. 44, 56 L. Ed. 163 ( 1911), Liin-
erick v. T. F. Scholes, Inc:., 10 Cir., 292 F. ~d 1 
195 (1961). But the explicit limits of senice 
of process historically have been meticulouslr ' 
guarded. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board. 
268 U.S. 619, 45 S. Ct. 621, 69 L. Ed. llI9 
( 1925), United States v. Rhoades, D.C. u 
F.R.D. 373 ( 1953). These limits have been set i 
by the Congress. Jiost recently, Federal Rule\ , 
of Civil Procedure, Rule 4 ( f) has been amended 
to permit senice of process extraterritorialk 
not to exceed one hundred miles from the pla~e 
of trial. See the comment on this amendment 
contained in the article by Ka plan (the reporter 
to the Advisory Committee) , Federal Rub , 
Amendments, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 631 (196.J. 1. 
It would appear that the statutory approach t'' 
service of process has been such as to discourage ' 
implied extensions." · 
POINT IY 
A DEFENDANT l\lA Y BE LIABLE FOR 
RECOYERY OF A PRE.MIUl\1 REALIZED IX 
THE SALE OF CONTROL OF A CORPORA· , 
TION, BUT SUCH A CLAI:\1 .MAY NOT BE 
BASED ON RL'LE lOb-5. 
This matter was settled by the United States Cir· , 
cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the 
companion cases of Birnbaum v. United States Steel, 
193 F. 2d 461 (2d Cir., 19.52) and Perlman z·. Feld-
mann, 219 F. 2d 173 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 349 C'.S. 
9.52 (1955). In the Birnhaum case, the Court of Ap- 1 
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peals for the Second Circuit held that recovery for 
sale of corporate control was not actionable under Rule 
1ob-5 and the same Court held in Perlrnan that the same 
facts did constitute a common law cause of action. (See 
78 Harv. L. Rev. 505, Jan. 1965). 
The argument of Plaintiff (Appellant herein) 
Cohne in the federal court action urged the Court to 
distinguish the Birnbaum case and hold jurisdiction 
\I as proper as to the recovery of the premium realized 
by l\lr. Salis bury. ( R. 229-236). The federal Court did 
not so hold, and granted the defendants' motions di-
rected to-and solely to-jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
The question of the liability of defendant Salisbury, 
Respondent herein, for selling control of Reliance Na-
tional Life Insurance Company has never been litigated 
and the Plaintiff-Appellant and the persons for whom 
he brought this action, have never had their "day in 
court". The United States District Court in Civil No. 
C-170-65, first struck references to pendent claims 
from the amended complaint and then determined that 
jusidiction over the person of the defendant was not 
present. The claims of plaintiff Cohne in the federal 
action were based solely on federal statutes and the 
ruling of the federal Court in no sense should be deemed 
res judicata as to a state court common law action. 
Accordingly, the order of the lower court dismiss-
13 
ing the Complaint of Plaintiff-Appellant should be 
reversed for error of law and the case remanded to the 
District Court for trial. 
Respectf uly submitted, 
Adam M. Duncan 
319 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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